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Abstract 
South Africa was recently included as a member of the BRICS grouping. South Africa's formal association 
with the powerful original members suggests that it possesses some international clout. Although South 
Africa pursues an active foreign policy, for example, as a region organizer, notably through New 
Partnership for Africa's Development, and as an issue leader championing development-related 
concerns, the normative direction of South Africa's international involvement has been unclear and 
often contradictory. This article illustrates how South Africa adheres to and departs from liberal 
principles when involved in the global politics of development. Middlepowership and domestic politics 
are identified as two sources of pressure on the liberal aspects of South African foreign policy.  
 
Introduction 
It is with some justification that South Africa is regarded as a leader of the developing world. The 
country campaigned for debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries, for the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to relax its patent protection on AIDS drugs, for the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations to be one that places 'development' at its heart, and played a leading role in the Kimberley 
Process to halt the flow of conflict diamonds, to name a few examples of its leadership on issues of 
importance to developing countries. Although the remarkable economic progress of Brazil, China and 
India has left South Africa trailing further behind, South Africa continues to be included as a voice for the 
developing world: South Africa was involved in last-ditch negotiations between US President Barack 
Obama and major developing countries to extract an agreement at the 2009 United Nations (UN) 
climate change talks in Copenhagen; South Africa is frequently invited to contribute to G8 summits; it is 
the only African member of the G20; and recently joined the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) grouping, 
now known as 'BRICS'. 
Despite the illustrious company it keeps, South Africa has limited international power. South Africa's 
efforts to influence matters beyond its borders are typically met with resistance, even from other 
developing countries, especially in Africa, on whose behalf it claims to speak. In response, South Africa 
has made wide use of multilateral diplomacy to augment its influence and smooth over resistance from 
others. Indeed, South Africa has sought to make multilateralism 'a central plank of its foreign policy' 
(Taylor and Williams, 2006, p. 9). However, identifying the principles that underlie South Africa's foreign 
policy has proved challenging. South African foreign policy has been described as vacillating and marked 
by 'ad-hoc-ery' (Evans, 1999, p. 624). Moreover, sometimes, South Africa acts as a 'pro-Western bridge 
builder' (Taylor and Williams, 2006, p. 6), for example, by getting other developing countries to sign on 
to an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 (Leith and Pretorius, 2009, p. 
350) or pushing other developing countries to adopt the neoliberal orthodoxy. On the other hand, 
Gerson (2008) has claimed that South Africa has deviated so far from the West that it should be called a 
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'rogue democracy', whereas Nathan sees anti-imperialism as an important strain in South African foreign 
policy (Nathan, 2005, p. 363). 
Ian Taylor's (2001) work represents probably the most articulate and theoretically self-conscious 
attempt to come to grips with the contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy. Many expected that 
the African National Congress (ANC), with its leftist leanings, its partnership with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and trade-union federation COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), 
and the extreme poverty of the bulk of its supporters, would pursue strongly redistributionist and 
interventionist economic policies when it assumed power in 1994. Although the ANC's 1994 economic 
plan, the Reconstruction and Development Program, contained some Keynesian elements, it was soon 
subordinated to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan. GEAR was a neoliberal 
response to the economic pressures of globalization, and as such pursued fiscal prudence, the 
liberalization of the South African economy, and foreign direct investment. While GEAR was welcomed 
by externally oriented capital, it was a betrayal of the ANC's supporters on the left (the trade unions and 
the poor). In Taylor's view, the contradictions in South African foreign policy stem from the conflicting 
demands of capital and the economic left. As South African economic policy has moved in favor of 
capital, the ANC government has, in order to placate its left-leaning domestic constituencies, rhetorically 
exaggerated its confrontation with the capitalist core. 
Taylor's is a neo-Marxist perspective, specifically an application of Robert Cox's (1996) adoption of 
Gramsci's ideas to international relations (IR). Taylor's reliance on Cox leads him to focus on institutions 
and conflicts that are mostly economic in nature and to relate these conflicts to those engendered by 
capitalism. Taylor's argument has been deservedly influential, but his theoretical commitments lead him 
to exclude or diminish foreign policy issues that are not primarily or necessarily economic, such as issues 
of human rights, culture, democracy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and race. Moreover, once one studies 
the more political aspects of South Africa's foreign policy in their own right, the country's diplomacy 
appears less closely hewn to the West. 
This article considers South Africa's involvement in the global politics of development and aims to 
identify the country's foreign policy contradictions and how these find expression in various multilateral 
settings. Although all states face constraints on their international behavior, the very idea of foreign 
policy implies a measure of agency; policymakers have some choice about which course of action to 
pursue. These choices are, at bottom, normative for they involve expressions about what we ought to 
do and which courses of action we must relegate or forego. Contradictions in South African foreign 
policy are presented as torn by five normative tensions (the next section). The identification of these 
five dimensions is a response to Vale and Taylor's (1999, p. 632) charge that scholars have paid too little 
attention 'to the overall thrust of South African foreign policy: the normative principles that underlie 
Pretoria's interaction with the international community'. 
Liberal views occupy one side of the five normative tensions. Although the opposite side cannot be 
brought under one ideological umbrella, the five departures from liberalism all give greater weight to 
the goals of the collective and thus tolerate greater intrusions on individual freedom than does 
liberalism. This means that on political and cultural matters, these departures from liberalism move in a 
communitarian direction, whereas on the economy it finds support in intellectual currents that argue for 
a greater role of the state in the economy. Liberalism is placed at the center because it is more 
comfortable including economic and political foreign policy issues than is Taylor's Coxian perspective. 
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Although liberalism is the ideological accompaniment of the American-led post-war international order 
(Ikenberry, 2011), liberalism is also, given its emphasis on freedom and human rights, a persuasive moral 
outlook in its own right. Attacks on liberal principles are therefore not only attacks on the West, but are 
also departures from the most widely accepted international moral perspective. 
Although morality matters in the making of foreign policy decisions, the next section points to two 
sources of strain on the liberal aspects of South Africa's foreign policy: domestic politics and pressures 
that stem from South Africa's effort to perform a 'middle power' role in the international system. The 
subsequent, longer section discusses South Africa's participation in four multilateral forums and 
indicates the conflicting normative principles that find expression. Three of these institutions - The India-
Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and WTO 
- are directly concerned with development, whereas the fourth - the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) - is not. However, the UNSC is included because much of South Africa's multilateralism takes into 
account what happens in the UNSC. 
 
Deviations from Liberalism 
In theoretical discussions of IR, the empirical is typically put in the foreground, whereas the normative 
aspects, although inescapable, are pushed to the back or ignored altogether (Frost, 1996). In this article, 
however, the normative aspects are brought to the fore and are used as the lens through which to view 
South Africa's multilateral diplomacy. In the five normative disputes below, liberal principles occupy one 
side. No obvious factor unites the other side. 
There are many forms of liberalism, but what unites them is the priority they give to freedom. 
Liberalism, as a theory of IR, tries to explain and predict international interaction. Liberal IR theory gives 
freedom an explanatory role - the capacity to choose allows for cooperation, moral progress and the 
option to avoid the unpleasant outcomes that realism sees as inevitable. However, in liberal theory, as 
in other IR theories, prescriptions are never far from view. This article focuses on the prescriptive, or 
normative, aspects of liberalism, that is, liberalism as a perspective on what is morally correct, rather 
than on liberalism as a theory that explains international interaction. 
The first of the five normative conflicts concerns the priority of liberal democracy, a political form in 
which negative freedom is the ultimate value. Liberals fear the oppression that individuals might have to 
endure if other values were to be given priority. John Rawls (1999a), for example, in his attempt to 
identify the fundamental principles of justice, gives the liberty principle priority over equalitarian 
principles. However, political societies and their leaders might have priorities that require a restriction of 
certain freedom in order to achieve more communal goals such as political stability, economic 
development or a theocratic vision (Table 1). 
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The liberal regards human rights as universally applicable, whereas the opposite side allows for national 
sovereignty to trump universal human rights when these two principles come into conflict. Even Rawls 
(1999b), who is relatively tolerant of the limits that other states may place on internal political freedom, 
requires that societies, in order to be regarded as at least 'decent', respect human rights (which includes 
the right to life and enough freedom of conscience to ensure freedom of thought), allow the right to 
dissent, and require their officials to treat such dissent with respect and address the merits of the 
question. Moral justification for giving priority to the sovereignty principle can be derived from the idea 
of self-determination and from an understanding of the individual as deeply formed by the culture in 
which she grew up. In recent years, there has been a greater acceptance that the sovereignty of states 
may be violated to protect human rights, which we see, for example, in the UN's adoption of the 
'responsibility to protect' and the prosecution by the International Criminal Court of political leaders 
guilty of crimes against humanity. 
Liberals aspire to deracinated human relations and think that universal agreement on moral questions is 
both possible and desirable. Communitarian critics of liberalism hold that there is no such thing as 
universal moral truths and emphasize that moral perspectives are bound and shaped by social context 
(Mulhall and Swift, 1996). Communitarians further argue that individual flourishing requires a certain 
closure of the political community so as to sustain the forms of life that give meaning to culturally 
situated individuals. In the African context, communitarian perspectives are blended with memories of 
colonial subjugation. Hence, liberal optimism about the possibility of universal moral agreement is met 
with perspectives that see cultural and racial relations as fraught with antagonism, inequality and 
representations of Africans as inferior. Moreover, liberalism's purported moral universalism is seen as a 
culturally specific moral perspective backed by hegemonic power. As a result, liberalism is likely to 
encounter charges of racial or cultural chauvinism and an insistence on the equal validity of non-
Western cultures. 
Liberals broadly accept the current neoliberal economic order; at most, they seek slight adjustments for 
the benefit of the world's poor, whereas the opposite side sees the international economic order as 
inherently unfair. Liberals tend to locate the causes of (and therefore the solution for) African poverty at 
the national level, whereas its African critics point to structural factors in the global economy. A clear 
example is the World Bank and the Organization for African Unity's (OAU) divergent explanations of 
Africa's poor economic performance in the 1970s. The World Bank's 'Berg Report' claimed that 
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'domestic policy issues are at the heart of the crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa' (quoted in Loxley, 1983, p. 
197), whereas the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action advanced a dependency argument (Taylor, 2005, p. 21). 
As for the appropriate relation between the state and the economy, liberals generally seek as much 
scope as possible for the free market. They see the market as a mechanism for achieving progressive 
aims. Critics of the liberal economic view see economic interaction as ridden by conflict and unequal 
power relations and tend to look to the state to achieve progressive objectives. Discomfort with the 
market mechanism thus pushes these critics toward either nationalization or the state-directed 
economic strategies characteristic of East Asian developmental states. 
 
Pressures on Liberalism 
Two factors seem to be of particular importance in explaining South Africa's foreign policy departures 
from liberalism: South Africa's particular middlepowership and its domestic politics. 
South Africa is frequently identified as a middle power (Hamill and Lee, 2001; Leith and Pretorius, 2009). 
Middle powers pursue activist foreign policies and perform two functions in the international system: 
they infuse the hegemonic order with legitimacy and they play a bridging role, the latter by mediating 
and brokering deals between conflicting third parties, building coalitions and consensus around matters 
of supranational importance and steering international interaction to multilateral settings (Cox, 1996, p. 
245). 
In order to distinguish South Africa from traditional middle powers such as Australia, Canada or Norway, 
South Africa is often identified as an 'emerging' middle power (Van der Westhuizen, 1998; Nel et al, 
2001; Schoeman, 2003). Such characterizations are intended to suggest that the country's middle power 
behavior is of recent vintage rather than that its behavior differs significantly from traditional middle 
powers. However, although South Africa continues to perform the actions that first led commentators to 
identify the country as a middle power, such as strengthening multilateral institutions, building 
coalitions and managing conflict, the normative orientation of South African middlepowership differs 
from that of traditional middle powers. Traditional middle powers remain close to the liberal values of 
the international order, whereas South African middlepowership frequently breaks out of the liberal 
normative band. This means that South Africa uses middle power strategies to both uphold and 
delegitimize the values of the Western-led international order. 
In order to broker a settlement between conflicting parties, middle powers have to assume a position 
between them. It is at these interjections that South African foreign policy gets pulled in disparate 
directions. In the economic domain, South Africa, as a spokesperson for the developing world, has had 
to navigate between the interests of global capital and more marginal groups. In disagreements over 
solutions to international conflicts of a more political nature, South Africa has frequently found itself 
between the West and various developing country groupings (Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), African Union (AU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and BRICS). Loyalty to 
developing country groupings pulls South Africa away from fully embracing the typically more liberal 
positions of the West. 
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Domestic politics is a second source of pressure on the liberal aspects of South Africa's foreign policy. 
Although citizens are largely excluded from the foreign policy process in South Africa (Nel et al, 2004, p. 
49), domestic political beliefs and debates do find expression in the country's foreign policy actions 
(Friedman, 2008, pp. 38-43). The three domestic political battles identified below provide a frame for 
much of South Africa's interaction with the rest of the world. 
The first struggle is over the role of the state in the economy. The story of South Africa's embrace of 
neoliberal economic policies was mentioned above and has been skillfully told elsewhere (Taylor, 2001; 
Marais, 2011). Throughout the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies, the ANC's partners on the left 
grumbled but were kept at bay. However, in 2008, the left-wing of the tripartite alliance ousted Mbeki, 
the neoliberal technocrat, and (eventually) installed Jacob Zuma as president, a presumed champion of 
the working class. The struggle between Zuma and Mbeki became a struggle over the direction of the 
ANC project (Southall, 2009, p. 317). Although Zuma fanned ethnic and racial tensions in support of his 
cause, he owed his rise primarily to anti-liberal economic forces - COSATU, the SACP and the ANC Youth 
League (ANCYL). The power of the economic left can be seen in the widespread acceptance in ANC 
circles of the idea that South Africa should become a 'developmental state' (Vickers, 2010, p. 154) and 
the return of economic nationalization to the agenda. 
The second battle concerns the nature of democracy. The anti-apartheid struggle was fought on the 
liberal idea that all people are equal, summed up by the anti-apartheid slogan 'one person, one vote'. 
South African democracy is marked by powerful liberal elements: a very liberal constitution, the rule of 
law, independent and well-functioning courts and a vocal media. However, the liberal aspects of 
democracy have come under strain. The attack on the liberal components of South African democracy 
gathered pace as the battle between Zuma and Mbeki raged. Recent years have seen attempts to 
undermine judicial independence, the lenient treatment of politically connected criminals, a weakening 
or dismantling of agencies with prosecutorial powers, encroachment on the editorial independence of 
the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation, Zuma filing lawsuits against his critics for 
alleged defamation, and the pushing through of a 'Protection of State Information Bill' that would allow 
bureaucrats to mark broad swathes of information as state 'secrets' and therefore off-limits. 
The third struggle concerns the issue of race. The fight against apartheid was against the oppression of 
Blacks by Whites, which itself is part of the wider struggle against Europe's colonial subjugation of 
Africa, and thus connects the plight of Black South Africans with the other peoples in Africa. The ANC's 
definition of itself as a non-racial organization and its goal of non-racialism strike one as rather awkward 
if one considers the primacy of race during apartheid and the struggle against it. It was the ANC's 
commitment to non-racialism that resulted in Robert Sobukwe and his followers' breaking away from 
the ANC to form the Pan African Congress, an Africanist organization. In a study of Black political 
thought in South Africa, Halisi (1999) claims that Black South Africans remain torn between non-
racialism and 'Black republicanism'. Despite the ANC's avowed non-racialism, it has been forced to 
promote the cause of Blacks to realize an equal non-racialism, an imperative that even the main 
opposition party, the right-of-center Democratic Alliance, accepts. Ironically, redress of past inequalities 
thus requires a re-racialization of South African society. This seems acceptable to liberals if the eventual 
goal remains non-racialism. However, Mbeki asserted a more Africanist posture than Mandela, 
exemplified by Mbeki's famous 1996 speech in which he declared 'I am an African'. Aspiring to non-
racialism while promoting one racial group has proved to be tricky, and there are signs that racial 
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integration is stalling and racial tensions are growing (Southall, 2010; mg.co.za/article/2009-12-09-
survey-reveals-pessimism-over-race-relations-in-sa). 
One might wonder about the sources of support and opposition to liberalism. The Democracy Alliance 
best embodies a commitment to liberal principles. Other liberal institutions include the print media, big 
business, the finance ministry and think tanks such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and 
the South African Institute for International Affairs. The ANC contains a fair number of liberals (for 
example, Trevor Manuel), but they have been in retreat since the rise of Zuma. The SACP and the ANCYL 
are the most vehemently anti-liberal groupings. On economic matters, COSATU supports the idea of 
turning South Africa into a developmental state and nationalizing the mines. However, on political 
matters, it is frequently more liberal than the ANC, for instance, by being more willing to criticize the 
Mugabe regime and warning that it would protest against the abovementioned 'secrecy bill'. Mbeki 
strikes one as a liberal, although his calls for an African Renaissance, his touchiness on race, and his 
defense of the sovereignty of other developing countries run counter to liberalism. Although Zuma was 
helped into power by the economic left, it is not clear that he shares their ideals. His main departure 
from liberalism comes on the cultural and democratic front: he is a polygamist; frequently speaks Zulu 
instead of English at political rallies; invokes the authority of the ancestors; during his rape trial, invoked 
Zulu 'traditions' in his defense; and, during his corruption trial, failed to stop his supporters from 
threatening the courts and slandering judges (Marais, 2011, p. 372). 
This section pointed to South Africa's specific position as a middle power and to the country's domestic 
politics as sources of pressure on South Africa's ability to uphold liberal principles in its foreign policy. 
The next section examines how these pressures find expression in South Africa's involvement in four 
multilateral forums. 
 
South Africa and Four Multilateral Institutions 
Middle powers direct much of their foreign policy through multilateral channels. Nel et al (2001, p. 9) 
distinguish between multilateral diplomacy and multilateralism. The former refers to 'the involvement 
of official state actors in the practices and institutions that facilitate cooperation between three or more 
states'. Multilateralism, according to Ruggie (1992, p. 571), refers to a pattern of international 
interaction whereby actors may not discriminate against other actors who want to cooperate; all actors 
derive roughly equal benefit over time (diffuse reciprocity); and members of a collectivity are regarded 
as indivisible. South Africa has challenged the failure to adhere to norms of non-discrimination and 
diffuse reciprocity at the UN and WTO. However, challenges to core multilateral institutions in terms of 
Ruggie's norms do not tell the full story, for we are left in the dark of what South Africa's preferences 
would be even when interactions conform to Ruggie's characterization. As Nel et al (2001, p. 13) put it, 
'we cannot avoid asking normative questions [in the sense of what is the "good"] about the institution of 
multilateralism, and particularly South Africa's conduct with respect to it'. Cox (1996, pp. 139-141) 
points out that the multilateral institutions created after World War II served to spread and legitimize 
the values of American hegemony. Taylor and Williams (2006, p. 5) remind us, however, that although 
multilateral institutions bear the imprint of the power relations that prevailed at their time of birth, they 
are also sites of political struggle, the outcome of which is not certain (Taylor and Williams, 2006, p. 5). 
South Africa has certainly seen multilateral institutions as a site for challenging the hegemonic order, 
specifically the liberalism that characterizes this order. 
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Before proceeding, one can make three observations about the patterns in South Africa's multilateral 
diplomacy. First, beyond using core multilateral institutions as arenas for challenging Western states, 
South Africa also tries to shift action and jurisdiction away from core multilateral institutions to 
multilateral locales where lesser states have more influence and where commitment to liberal principles 
are weaker. Second, although South Africa frequently mixes liberal and non-liberal elements, the pull 
away from liberalism is the strongest when the issue at hand is more political rather than economic, and 
when an African state is involved. Third, in terms of the four modes of international engagement 
identified by vom Hau et al (2012), South Africa can be said to display all four, without exhibiting a clear 
preference for any particular mode. In this article, however, the focus will be on South Africa as a 'region 
organizer' for its taking on of leadership roles in regionally defined organizations and as a 'region 
mobilizer' for its efforts to strengthen ties with neighboring countries. 
 
The United Nations Security Council 
Many of the UNSC's decisions (and non-decisions) reflect the permutations that stem from its structure - 
five permanent members with a veto and ten non-veto members serving 2-year stints. Reform of the 
UNSC is a key concern for many developing countries and their organizations. The AU, NAM and IBSA all 
want a more inclusive Security Council. South Africa, a likely beneficiary of an expanded UNSC, has been 
at the forefront of efforts to reform the Council. South Africa argues that the Security Council should 
better reflect 'changed geopolitical realities' (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 25). Past 
campaigns for Security Council reform have been stillborn because it would require permanent 
members to willingly dilute their own influence. However, during a BRICS summit in April 2011, Security 
Council reform inched away from the realm of fantasy when Russia and China came out supporting 
Brazil, India and South Africa 'to play a greater role in the UN' (www.thestar.co.za/brics-call-for-un-
security-council-reform-1.1057014). 
South Africa has also challenged the West in the day-to-day business of the Council, on which it served 
during 2007-2008 and will again do so in 2011-2012. Although South Africa's voting record suggests 
considerable conformity - during its 2007-2008 term, South Africa voted in favor of 120 of 121 
resolutions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 8) - the country emerged as a highly recalcitrant 
member of the Security Council. UN Watch, a non-governmental watchdog, points out that when it 
came to voting on human rights issues, South Africa's record in 2007 was worse than that of Saudi 
Arabia (blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2010/10/12/rights-activists-urge-south-africa-to-vote-like-a-
democracy-on-security-council-recall-poor-voting-record-of-prior-term/). When South Africa tried to 
obstruct Western powers from using the Security Council to extend their influence, it did so in 
principally two ways. First, South Africa would oppose or try to water down resolutions that insisted on 
liberal principles such as human rights or individual culpability. Second, South Africa would question 
whether the Security Council is the appropriate institution for dealing with a specific issue and try to 
push the matter toward a jurisdiction where Western powers have less influence. These ploys are visible 
in the South Africa's four most controversial stances during its 2007-2008 term. 
South Africa started its stint on the Security Council by voting, alongside Russia and China, against a 
resolution condemning human rights abuses in Burma. South Africa pointed to a finding by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations that Burma does not pose a threat to regional security. However, 
South Africa's argument that the matter should be handled by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
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featured more prominently. The HRC is an organization in which the 'Western European and Others' 
group is assigned only seven of the 47 seats. The HRC was created in 2005 to replace the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, which had become too politicized. However, in its short existence, the 
HRC has already become just as politicized and prone to regional block voting as its predecessor. At the 
HRC, regional groups 'never issue statements that are critical of one of their own' and tend rather to 
congratulate their neighbors and allies on their human rights records (Abebe, 2009, p. 19). 
As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa's involvement with 
concerns over Iran's nuclear program followed it into the Security Council. At the IAEA, South Africa 
opposed referring Iran to the Security Council, a body able to impose sanctions. South Africa maintained 
this position, even as a number of other NAM states in the IAEA succumbed to pressure and moved to 
favor reporting Iran to the Security Council (Ogilvie-White, 2007, pp. 461-466). When a draft resolution 
to impose stiffer sanction on Iran came before the Security Council in March 2007, South Africa sought a 
substantial weakening of the proposed sanctions, as well as a 90-day time-out to allow for further 
negotiation with Iran (http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-03-20-voa2.html). Although 
the final resolution was adopted unanimously in close to its original form, South Africa expressed its 
disappointment and continued to argue that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum to deal 
with Iran's nuclear program. 
South Africa has since 2004 been involved in efforts to resolve various aspects of the brutal conflict in 
the Darfur region of Sudan. During this time, South Africa consistently tried to pull the problems in 
Sudan toward the jurisdiction of the AU, on whose behalf Mbeki was acting as a negotiator. South Africa 
preferred a soft rather than a punitive approach to Khartoum. Although one could make a case for 'quiet 
diplomacy', there is more to South Africa's soft approach than solving the conflict at hand; it was also 
intended as a challenge to the West and an effort to keep them at bay. As Dumisani Kumalo, South 
Africa's ambassador to the UN, admitted in 2004, 'We [South Africa] want to resolve the issue and there 
are countries just dying to punish Sudan for what is happening and that is why the call for the reform of 
the UN is getting louder' (196.35.74.234/world/other/0,2172,88130,00.html). During its 2007-2008 term 
on the Security Council, South Africa once more got to apply its soft diplomatic touch when, in July 2007, 
it opposed a draft resolution (put forward by Britain, France and Ghana) to impose sanctions against 
Sudan, with Kumalo calling any mention of sanctions 'totally unacceptable' 
(news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6902400.stm). 
The most notorious example of South Africa's gentle diplomacy has been its long-standing mollycoddling 
of the oppressive Mugabe regime in neighboring Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe case is an excellent example 
of South Africa's preference for political stability rather than democracy and of South Africa's effort to 
protect the sovereignty of a developing country. South Africa has consistently argued that Zimbabwe's 
problems do not pose a threat to international security and should thus be dealt with by the SADC, not 
the Security Council. At the Security Council, South Africa continued its protection of the Zimbabwean 
government, when, during April 2008, South Africa opposed the sending of a UN envoy to Zimbabwe to 
resolve the standoff that followed the 29 March election. It was therefore surprising when, on 23 June 
2008, South Africa and the other 14 members of the Security Council passed a 'Presidential Statement' 
deploring the political repression that surrounded the March 2008 elections. However, less than 3 
weeks later, South Africa voted against a draft resolution to impose an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and 
a financial freeze and travel ban on its leaders. South Africa repeatedly argued that any international 
moves would undermine Mbeki's efforts, under the SADC banner, to solve the post-election crisis. 
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South Africa's actions on the Security Council (2007-2008) frequently reflected an insistence on respect 
for national sovereignty and an effort to evade Western efforts to apply liberal standards to various 
conflicts. Although one may certainly question Western motives, South African resistance nevertheless 
resulted in the weakening of human rights principles and the protection of abusive rulers. Under the 
Zuma presidency, there have been signs that South African foreign policy might return to the greater 
liberalism of the Mandela era. For one, Zuma has taken a tougher line on Zimbabwe. More significantly, 
on 17 March 2011, South Africa, alongside France, Britain and the United States, voted in favor of 
Security Council resolution 1973 to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. This vote was a move away from 
South Africa's usual exaggerated loyalty to incumbents in the developing world and made more 
significant by the abstention of the other four BRICS members. Moreover, just a week before, the AU 
had 'reaffirmed its strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as 
well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form' (African Union, 2011a, p. 1). 
However, the troubles in Libya soon brought out the illiberal tendencies in South African foreign policy. 
A few weeks after the Security Council vote, South Africa joined its BRICS partners in condemning NATO 
air strikes on Libya. Throughout, the AU insisted on a bigger role in solving the Libyan situation, for it 
was a conflict that it saw as holding 'far-reaching consequences, especially given the important role that 
the country has been playing in the implementation of the African agenda' (African Union, 2011b, p. 3). 
In the first part of April, the AU, led by South Africa, did get 'brother leader', as Zuma referred to 
Gaddafi, to accept a ceasefire. However, the rebels rejected the 'roadmap for peace' because it 
contained no demand that Gaddafi relinquish power. The AU deal also went against the West's 
insistence that Gaddafi step down. As the war wound down, South Africa continued to criticize NATO's 
role in Libya and only recognized the rebels as the legitimate government of the Libya well after major 
African states such as Nigeria and Kenya. Tellingly, after Gaddafi had met his end, the ANCYL took to the 
streets to bemoan the fall of an 'anti-imperialist martyr' (www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2011/10/21/anc-
youth-league-salutes-gaddafi). 
Although South Africa went along with the vast majority of resolutions that passed through the Security 
Council, when South Africa did depart from the liberal script it was to support various developing 
country groupings against the wishes of the Western powers on the Council. However, a desire for 
solidarity with the developing world was on its own not enough to lead South Africa away from liberal 
commitments to democracy and human rights. Rather, South Africa's departures from liberal principles 
in its foreign policy also depended on no more than weak or fractured domestic support for liberalism in 
order for such illiberal foreign policy stances to pass. 
 
New Partnership for Africa's Development 
NEPAD is a merger of the Omega Plan of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade and the Millennium 
Partnership for the African Recovery Program (MAP) of Mbeki, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo and 
Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika. NEPAD is an excellent example of South Africa's engagement in region 
organizing behavior (see vom Hau et al, this issue). After NEPAD's launch in 2001, Mbeki became the 
principal spokesperson for NEPAD, a plan that sought to lift Africa out of poverty and integrate African 
economies with each other and with the rest of the world. Whereas Africa's previous big economic plan, 
the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, was rooted in dependency theory, NEPAD represents a step in a liberal 
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direction for its willingness to blame much of Africa's problems on bad governance and policies and for 
its embrace of the market (Taylor, 2005, p. 21). Moreover, NEPAD's peer review mechanism represents 
a soft effort to let liberal values pierce national sovereignty. However, NEPAD harbors significant 
departures from liberalism - it sees the state as the main economic driver; it is ambivalent about 
whether it favors democracy or political stability (Jordaan, 2007, p. 349); it is strongly pan-Africanist; 
and, in practice, has remained very respectful of national sovereignty. 
Although criticism of NEPAD has mounted, South Africa continues to support it, by, for example, hosting 
the NEPAD Secretariat (now called the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency). NEPAD is a South 
African-led attempt to use multilateral institutions to promote development and moderate the behavior 
and policies of African countries in a liberal direction. However, NEPAD has accomplished little of 
tangible significance. NEPAD itself tells us that progress between 2005 and 2008 had been 'negligible' 
(NEPAD, 2011, p. 7), whereas Ross Herbert, who has been close to the entire NEPAD process, informs us 
that before 2005 NEPAD was mostly a 'talk shop' (www.theindependent.co.zw/opinion/17892.pdf). 
However, it is not that easy to figure out exactly what NEPAD does. As Motsi puts it, NEPAD is an 
'institution, secretariat, ideological manifestation, bargaining chip and validation instrument', an entity 
'impossible to coherently analyze' (quoted in Taylor, 2010, p. 63). When reading NEPAD documents, one 
is confronted by a staggering web of cross-referenced institutions, jargon, targets, priorities, principles 
and commitments (see NEPAD, 2011). Ross Herbert (2003, p. 102) suggests that we understand NEPAD 
as performing three roles. First, NEPAD offers a collective voice for negotiating with donors. Donors 
were encouraged when a peer review mechanism was put at the center of NEPAD, because initially it 
seemed as though this instrument would force African leaders to govern better. However, Mbeki soon 
decried the 'ignorance and confusion' of donors who expected peer review to contain a punitive 
element. He emphasized that the envisioned peer review would be 'non-adversarial' and based on 
'mutual trust among states involved in the review' (ANC, 2002). In other words, Mbeki immediately 
caved toward respect for national sovereignty. As what was most distinctive and promising about 
NEPAD was stripped at the outset, donors have allocated mere 'token' funds to NEPAD initiatives 
(http://www.theindependent.co.zw/opinion/17892.html). NEPAD's budgetary details are hard to come 
by, but it is telling that whereas NEPAD's 2008 development 'action plan' estimated that its projects 
would cost US$115 billion, the 2011 plan puts its total needs at below US$11 billion (NEPAD, 2011, pp. 
6-8). 
Second, NEPAD acts as a development agency and claims that it is transforming itself into 'the first 
development agency of the continent' (mg.co.za/article/2010-03-19-the-new-nepad). NEPAD has 
certainly attached its name to a number of projects, from research on food security to rural 
development programs. But that is just it. Rather than designing and directing projects, it seems that 
NEPAD mostly puts its name on projects that originated elsewhere (Taylor, 2005). 
NEPAD's third role is as creator and enforcer of standards of economic and political governance - the 
task of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Countries that sign up for review volunteer to let their 
African peers assess their performance in the economic, social, corporate and political domains. 
Unfortunately, the elaborate rituals of self-evaluation and peer assessment produced little new 
knowledge. Furthermore, peer review has proved utterly incapable of getting states under review to 
behave differently, especially on matters related to democracy, which, after all, was the basis on which 
NEPAD was promoted (Taylor, 2005, p. 64). Fourteen countries have thus far completed their review. 
12 
 
Among the first was Rwanda, which Freedom House regards as 'unfree', yet it sailed through its 
evaluation (Jordaan, 2007). In the case of Algeria, another country regarded as 'unfree' at the time of 
review, its peer reviewers were encouraged by the government's acknowledgement of the principles of 
good governance and its 'strong political will' to carry them out (NEPAD, 2007, p. 322). Neither Rwanda 
nor Algeria's Freedom House scores have budged since they passed their reviews 
(www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year=2010). 1 
Mbeki's early retreat on the invasiveness of African Peer Review Mechanism was out of recognition that 
African leaders would not be willing or able to change in the ways that Western donors expected of 
them. In the end, NEPAD did little more than put a liberal veneer on the neo-patrimonial governance 
that Taylor (2005) sees as characteristic of African politics. NEPAD offers streams of rhetoric on free 
markets, democracy and human rights, commitments that drew heavily from post-apartheid South 
Africa's example of democratization and economic liberalization. However, NEPAD, despite its generally 
liberal thrust, also contains significant deviations from liberalism - it pushes forward the state as the 
conductor of economic development and accepts circumscribed interpretations of democracy and 
human rights, which we know, after the earlier discussion of three defining struggles in South African 
politics (around race, democracy and the economy), are not without support in South African domestic 
politics. 
 
World Trade Organization 
South Africa signed on to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994 and 
became an active participant in subsequent WTO negotiations. Upon joining the WTO, South Africa tried 
to broker agreements within the organization and to promote and legitimize its project. However, in 
recent years, South Africa's participation in the WTO has changed. South Africa still tries to broker 
agreements and build coalitions within the organization, but it has adopted positions that are 
increasingly at odds with the Quad (Canada, European Union, Japan and the United States). One part of 
South Africa's disagreement with the Quad is liberal - it wants liberalization of the Northern agricultural 
markets - which, although it has long been a source of disagreement, 2 is a point on which South Africa 
has grown more insistent. The other and more recent departure from what the Western powers want is 
an effort to allow the state in the developing countries more room for maneuver. 
In the wake of the Uruguay Round, many developing countries struggled to come to grips with its 
prescriptions. These countries balked at the prospect of having to deal with yet more new issues, 
particularly when industrialized states had not met many of their Uruguay Round commitments (Keet, 
2002, pp. 7-10). South Africa, by contrast, favored the EU's proposal to move on to a new round of trade 
negotiations. Despite efforts to overcome their disagreements, South Africa entered the Third 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle in 1999 at odds with other African countries. At the Seattle 
talks, South Africa was occasionally pulled into 'green room' meetings with the Quad where it was seen, 
as indeed it saw itself, as a leader of Africa. South Africa tried to act as a bridge between the 
industrialized world and the developing world, even though a deep schism had opened up between 
South Africa and the Africa Group (Keet, 2002, pp. 6-12). South Africa was simply too close to the West 
to convincingly perform a bridging role. Donna Lee (2006, p. 63) argues that during the early years of the 
Doha Round, no other developing country had 'so comprehensively conformed to the orthodoxy' as 
South Africa. 
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After the collapse of the Seattle talks, South Africa remained in favor of a further round of trade talks. 
South Africa tried to mend the gap between other developing countries and itself by adopting the 
position that industrialized states have not gone far enough to meet their Uruguay Round commitments 
(Keet, 2002, p. 19). South Africa also tried to win the assurance that the next round of trade talks would 
address the developmental concerns of poorer countries. Despite an effort at mending fences, South 
Africa's relations with other developing countries remained strained. In 2001, South Africa was still close 
to the major powers, its proximity suggested by its appointment as one of six 'Friends of the Chair' at the 
Doha Ministerial Conference during that year. However, the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun 
in 2003 marked the beginning of South Africa's shift away from the industrialized world (Vickers, 2010, 
p. 150). At Cancun, developing countries protested the inclusion of the so-called 'Singapore Issues' and 
were threatening to walk out of the negotiations.3 South Africa, however, favored negotiation and was 
willing to keep the Singapore Issues on the table. South Africa found itself isolated from fellow members 
of developing country coalitions such as the G20+ and the Africa Group (Lee, 2006, p. 68). Despite South 
Africa's isolation, in the end, when developing countries staged a walkout, South Africa had little choice 
but to join their ranks. 
After the collapse of the Cancun talks, South Africa began drifting away from the major powers. South 
Africa has grown more insistent that the United States and Europe liberalize their agricultural sectors. 
South Africa's current position is that an agreement on agriculture needs to occur before agreements on 
other aspects of trade can take place. Whereas a call for the liberalization of Northern agriculture is 
consistent with the liberal thrust of the WTO, South Africa, once an eager liberalizer, now wants more 
flexibility on the way developing countries may use industrial tariffs. South Africa's newfound desire to 
raise tariffs corresponds to its aspirations to become a developmental state, that is, a state that actively 
tries to develop internationally competitive industries in certain sectors, which often requires a tariff 
shield. Although a desire for state interference in the economy has long been present among South 
Africa's liberation movements, such interference contrasts with South Africa's behavior during the 
1990s, when it liberalized its trade ahead of WTO stipulations and generally tried to get the state out of 
the economy (Vickers, 2010, pp. 154-155). However, Vickers (2010, pp. 170-171) points out that South 
Africa seems to have put more emphasis on agricultural trade reform than is warranted by the 
contribution of agriculture to the country's economy, which, although not unimportant, would bring 
fewer material benefits to South Africa than would a deal on more flexibility on non-agricultural goods.4 
This suggests that South Africa is giving agricultural liberalization such priority out of loyalty to other 
developing countries. 
 
India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum 
In the aftermath of the collapse of trade talks at Cancun, Trevor Manuel, the then South African finance 
minister, stated that 'The key question is whether the same grouping of developing countries [that 
walked out of the talks] would seek a new arrangement out of the Bretton Woods institutions' (Business 
Day, 2003). IBSA, created a few months before the Cancun trade talks, is not such an arrangement, nor 
is it intended to be. Rather, IBSA is, as its full name suggests, a forum for strategic dialogue between 
three developing country democracies. Although IBSA states wear their democratic credentials proudly, 
the organization has no intention of promoting democracy. 
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At the rhetorical level, IBSA remains committed to the liberalizing trajectory of global trade and to 
negotiated solutions in the WTO. However, the participation of all three IBSA members in the walkout at 
Cancun suggests that rhetoric masks the extent to which they are at odds with industrialized states. IBSA 
demands that industrialized states undertake greater liberalization, especially of their agricultural 
sectors, commit to the developmental goals of the Doha Round and lower their demands for 
liberalization by developing countries. However, although IBSA's desire for 'globalization with equity' 
chafes against the inequality that economic liberalization causes, it remains well within the liberal 
paradigm (Taylor, 2009). 
However, it is the connections that IBSA states have developed that present a more significant challenge 
to the West. For one, bilateral trade among the IBSA states has grown exponentially (see Taylor, 2009, p. 
51) and constitutes what some realists would call a form of 'soft-balancing' against the hegemon (Pape, 
2005, p. 37). Moreover, IBSA states have undertaken to closely coordinate their actions and work in 
partnership with other developing countries. The IBSA grouping insists on reform of the UN General 
Assembly and wants the Security Council to add more permanent and non-permanent seats, with more 
developing countries occupying more of both types. Such ambitions are nothing new, but, as mentioned 
above, what has changed is that Russia and China are lending more support to the aspirations of the 
IBSA states. Given that support for IBSA's UN ambitions comes from the two authoritarian members of 
the BRICS grouping, we have reason to worry about the role of a possibly reformed Council in the 
protection of human rights. We might have been given a glimpse of things to come when, in late 2011, 
during a vote in the Security Council on whether to threaten Syria with economic sanctions for its brutal 
crackdown on opponents of the regime, all three IBSA states abstained, whereas China and Russia 
vetoed. 
In the Brasilia Declaration of 2003, the founding document of IBSA, the three members point out that 
they are 'vibrant democracies', yet the document does not contain any commitment to promote 
democracy or human rights, even though it includes a commitment to protect people against second-
hand tobacco smoke. The declarations that have followed the four further IBSA summits - the most 
recent one was held in April 2010 - continue to proclaim the democratic credentials of the three 
member states, but still do not profess any commitment to promote democracy. By contrast, a 
commitment to human rights began appearing in the declaration made after the second summit in 
2007. However, this commitment is always expressed with reference to IBSA states' membership and 
commitment to the HRC as the appropriate forum for human rights issues. As discussed above, the HRC 
is a South-dominated enclave, which, rather than promote the cause of human rights, more often than 
not serves to ward off human rights criticism. IBSA's tepid commitment to human rights suggests that in 
a somehow reformed Security Council, in which these three states will most probably enjoy an 
enhanced position, the IBSA powers, alongside their undemocratic backers in Russia and China, will 
decline to defend human rights or will shuffle it off to the HRC where little will come of it. 
South Africa's involvement in IBSA plays out the foreign policy pattern that should be familiar by now: 
increased solidarity with other developing countries; a broad commitment to liberal economic policies, 
coupled with an attempt to allow more room for the state; and little appetite to promote human rights 
or democracy elsewhere in the world. 
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Conclusion 
South Africa's foreign policy has long been plagued by contradictions. This article tied one pole of this 
contradictoriness to liberal principles in order to study South Africa's engagement with four multilateral 
institutions (the Security Council, NEPAD, WTO and IBSA). It was shown that South African 
multilateralism frequently wavered in its commitment to liberal principles and that it was especially on 
matters of a political rather than an economic nature that South Africa moved away from its liberal 
commitments. The reasons for these departures from liberalism were said to reside, first, in South 
Africa's fraught position as an emerging middle power trying to mediate between the West and the 
developing world and, second, in the central struggles in the country's domestic politics. 
An issue that remained in the background was the nature of South Africa's association with the 
developing world, as well as the alignments among developing countries themselves. Moreover, the 
changing power relations between the West and the developing world, which have been hastened by 
the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, were not remarked upon. It appears likely that the growing 
power of the developing world and the relative decline of the West will relieve pressure on South Africa 
to behave liberally. As it stands, liberal principles have already fallen victim to South Africa's desire to 
confront the West. Although departures from liberalism on the economic front may have progressive 
consequences, the clearest departures from liberal principles have come on more political issues. These 
departures from political liberalism threaten the hard-won gains in human rights and democratization of 
recent decades. 
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Endnotes 
1. Rwanda completed its peer review in 2006, and Algeria in 2007. Since then, the scores for political 
rights and civil liberties in these two countries have remained at 6 and 5, respectively (7 is the least 
free, 1 is the most). 
2. South Africa joined the Cairns Group, a coalition of 19 agricultural exporting countries seeking the 
liberalization of trade in agriculture, in 1998. 
3. The Singapore Issues refer to negotiations around trade and investment, government procurement, 
trade facilitation and competition policy. 
 
16 
 
4. Agriculture contributes 4 per cent of South Africa's gross domestic product, provides 10 per cent of 
the jobs in the formal sector and accounts for around 8 per cent of the country's exports (Vickers, 
2010, p. 170). 
 
References 
Abebe, A.M. (2009) Of shaming and bargaining: African states and the universal periodic review of the 
United Nations human rights council. Human Rights Law Review 9 (1): 1-35. 
African Union. (2011a) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Activities of the Au High Level 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Situation in Libya. 26 April, Addis Ababa: Peace and Security Council. 
African Union. (2011b) Statement by Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra to the 275th AU Peace and Security 
Council Ministerial Meeting Devoted to a Debate on the State of Peace and Security in Africa. 26 April, 
Addis Ababa. 
ANC. (2002) Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer-review. ANC Today 2 (45), 8-14 November. 
Business Day. (2003) WTO - Roles of multilateral institutions need review - Manuel. 18 September. 
Cox, R.W. (1996) Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Department of Foreign Affairs. (2009) South Africa in the United Nations Security Council (2007-2008). 
Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Evans, G. (1999) South Africa's foreign policy after Mandela: Mbeki and his concept of an African 
Renaissance. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 88 (352): 621-628. 
Friedman, S. (2008) 'We met the enemy and he is US': Domestic politics and South Africa's role in 
promoting African democracy. African Journal of International Affairs 11 (2): 29-53. 
Frost, M. (1996) Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gerson, M. (2008) The despots' democracy. Washington Post 28 May. 
Halisi, C.D.R. (1999) Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press. 
Hamill, J. and Lee, D. (2001) A middle power paradox? South African diplomacy in the post-apartheid era. 
International Relations 15 (4): 33-59. 
Herbert, R. (2003) Implementing NEPAD: A critical assessment. In: R. Culpeper (ed.) Africa Report: Assessing 
the New Partnership. Ottawa, ON: North-South Institute. 
Ikenberry, G.J. (2011) Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World 
Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Jordaan, E. (2007) Grist for the Sceptic's mill: Rwanda and the African peer review mechanism. Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 25 (3): 331-353. 
17 
 
Keet, D. (2002) South Africa's Official Position and Role in Promoting the World Trade Organization. Cape 
Town, South Africa: Alternative Information and Development Center (AIDC). 
Lee, D. (2006) South Africa in the world trade organization. In: D. Lee, I. Taylor and P. Williams (eds.) The 
New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Leith, R. and Pretorius, J. (2009) Eroding the middle ground: The shift in foreign policy underpinning South 
African nuclear diplomacy. Politikon 36 (3): 345-361. 
Loxley, J. (1983) The Berg report and the model of accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Review of African 
Political Economy 10 (27-28): 197-204. 
Marais, H. (2011) South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change. Claremont, CA: UCT 
Press. 
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1996) Liberals and Communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Nathan, L. (2005) Consistency and inconsistency in South Africa's foreign policy. International Affairs 81 (2): 
361-372. 
Nel, P., Taylor, I. and Van der Westhuizen, J. (2001) Reformist initiatives and South Africa's multilateral 
diplomacy: A framework for understanding. In: P. Nel, I. Taylor and J. Van der Westhuizen (eds.) South 
Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits of Reformism. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Nel, P., Van Wyk, J.-A. and Johnsen, K. (2004) Democracy, participation and foreign policy making in South 
Africa. In: P. Nel and J. Van der Westhuizen (eds.) Democratizing Foreign Policy: Lessons from South 
Africa. Oxford: Lexington Books. 
NEPAD. (2007) Country Review Report of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria. African Peer Review 
Mechanism Country Review Report No. 4. Midrand: NEPAD. 
NEPAD. (2011) Revision of the AU/NEPAD Action Plan 2010-2015. Midrand, South Africa: NEPAD. 
Pape, R.A. (2005) Soft balancing against the United States. International Security 30 (1): 7-45. 
Ogilvie-White, T. (2007) International responses to Iranian nuclear defiance: The non-aligned movement 
and the issue of non-compliance. European Journal of International Law 18 (3): 453-476. 
Rawls, J. (1999a) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1999b) The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press. 
Ruggie, J.G. (1992) Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution. International Organization 46 (3): 561-
598. 
Schoeman, M. (2003) South Africa as an emerging middle power. African Security Review 9 (3): 47-58. 
Southall, R. (2009) Understanding the 'Zuma tsunami'. Review of African Political Economy 36 (121): 317-
333. 
Southall, R. (2010) Jacob zuma: A year of drift. OpenDemocracy , http://www.opendemocracy.net/roger-
southall/jacob-zuma-year-of-drift, accessed 8 June 2011. 
18 
 
Taylor, I. (2001) Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations. Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Taylor, I. (2005) NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development of Another False Start? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Taylor, I. (2009) 'The south will rise again?' New alliances and global governance: The India-Brazil-South 
Africa dialogue forum. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 36 (1): 45-58. 
Taylor, I. (2010) Governance and relations between the European Union and Africa: The case of NEPAD. 
Third World Quarterly 31 (1): 51-67. 
Taylor, I. and Williams, P. (2006) Introduction: Understanding South Africa's multilateralism. In: D. Lee, I. 
Taylor and P. Williams (eds.) The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vale, P. and Taylor, I. (1999) South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy five years on - From pariah state to 
'just another country?'. The Round Table 88 (352): 629-634. 
Van der Westhuizen, J. (1998) South Africa's emergence as a middle power. Third World Quarterly 19 (3): 
435-456. 
Vickers, B. (2010) 'Reclaiming development' in multilateral trade. In: A. Narlikar and B. Vickers (eds.) 
Leadership and Change in the Multilateral Trading System. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Republic of 
Letters Publishing. 
